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ABSTRACT: Is it ever rational to suspend judgment about whether a particular doxastic attitude of ours is 
rational? An agent who suspends about whether her attitude is rational has serious doubts that it is. These 
doubts place a special burden on the agent, namely, to justify maintaining her chosen attitude over others. 
A dilemma arises. Providing justification for maintaining the chosen attitude would commit the agent to 
considering the attitude rational—contrary to her suspension on the matter. Alternatively, in the absence of 
such justification, the attitude would be arbitrary by the agent’s own lights, and therefore irrational from 
the agent’s own perspective. So, suspending about whether an attitude of ours is rational does not cohere 
with considering it rationally preferable to other attitudes, and leads to a more familiar form of epistemic 
akrasia otherwise.  
 
I. Higher-level suspension 
Some combinations of doxastic attitudes seem to entail irrationality. If we are more 
confident that Linda is a feminist bank teller than we are that she is a bank teller, then at 
least one of our attitudes is irrationally had. The same can be said of agents who strongly 
believe that bad things happen only to those who have done wrong, strongly believe that 
a bad thing has happened to them, but strongly disbelieve that they have done wrong. 
The thought is that no situation rationally permits such combinations of attitudes, and so 
an agent must be committing some error of rationality by having them. 
 Among the candidates for irrational combinations are what have been called 
epistemically akratic attitudes. These are combinations of certain lower-level and higher-level 
doxastic attitudes—where a lower-level attitude is about some proposition p, and a 
higher-level attitude is about that lower-level attitude. Epistemically akratic 




of doxastic disapproval (like disbelief or low confidence) toward the rationality of that 
lower-level attitude. For example, an agent has epistemically akratic attitudes if she 
believes both that civilization hardly contributes to global warming and that this belief of 
hers is irrational. Such an agent would not be endorsing her own view about global 
warming as rational, which would make it unclear why she continues to have it. So, it is 
natural to think that something is rationally defective with agents who have epistemically 
akratic attitudes. Of course, not all combinations of lower-level and higher-level doxastic 
attitudes suggest irrationality. Epistemically enkratic combinations of attitudes, which are 
had when agents consider their own beliefs to be rational, are unproblematic. 
 Between clearly akratic and clearly enkratic combinations of doxastic attitudes there 
is interesting territory. There, we find agents who neither believe nor disbelieve that their 
own beliefs are rational. It is harder to know what to say about such agents and their 
beliefs. As Roderick Chisholm (1989: 6) states, while it is wrong to reason from 
presuppositions that we explicitly consider unjustified, there is nothing clearly wrong 
with reasoning from presuppositions that we merely do not explicitly consider justified. 
So there is at least a prima facie difference between the rational status of combining a 
belief with disbelief that it is rational, and the rational status of combining a belief with 
suspension of judgment about whether it is rational. I will describe agents who suspend 
judgment about whether a particular belief of theirs is rational as being in the state of 
higher-level suspension. My focus will be the rational status of such a combination of 
attitudes, i.e., having a belief and at the same time suspending judgment about whether 
that belief is rational. In question form: 
 
(Higher-Level Suspension Question) Is it ever rational to suspend judgment about 




 Quite a bit rests on our answer to the Higher-Level Suspension Question. On the one 
hand, if higher-level suspension is often rational, peer disagreement might not have as 
strong an effect as it seems.1 We could believe p, meet an epistemic equal who disbelieves 
p, and continue believing p while suspending about whether our belief is rational.2 On 
the other hand, suppose that upon consideration of any proposition p, we should believe, 
disbelieve, or suspend judgment about it.3 And suppose that akratic combinations are 
irrational. If higher-level suspension is irrational too, then whenever we should believe 
p, we should also believe that we should believe p. Our justification for any proposition 
would thus turn out to be self-intimating, thereby establishing a surprisingly strong level-
connection principle.4 So interesting things follow both from a positive and from a 
negative answer to the question. 
 Here I pursue a (qualified) negative answer. I argue that it is irrational to suspend 
judgment about whether a particular belief of ours is rational, on the assumption that 
outright akratic combinations of attitudes are irrational. My goal is to show that if 
epistemic akrasia is irrational, so is higher-level suspension. Suspending about whether 
our belief is rational is no better than believing that it is not. If this is right, it would mean 
that denying the rationality of akrasia has more radical implications than it seems. I begin 
with a brief overview of the dialectic, along with a rough sketch of the main argument to 
come (§2). I then defend the view that higher-level suspension implies irrationality (§3), 
 
1  Many consider disagreement to be of high epistemic significance for the disagreed-upon proposition. See, for 
instance, Feldman (2006), Christensen (2007), and Cohen (2013). 
2  Such a position would be in line with so-called level-splitting views, such as Hazlett’s (2012), Lasonen-Aarnio’s 
(2020), and Weatherson’s (2019).  
3  Smithies’ (2012) Exclusiveness thesis and Turri’s (2012) Optimism thesis express a similar thought.  
4  See Smithies (2012), Dutant & Littlejohn (2016), and Kiesewetter (2016) for discussions of level-connection 




and address two challenges to the account (§4).  
 Two clarifications before starting. First, the sense of ‘suspension’ I will appeal to is 
that of medium confidence, or a middling credence (Hájek 1998:204; Christensen 2009: 757). 
On this take, suspending about whether a proposition is true amounts to being roughly 
equally confident that it is true and that it is false. Although far from being the only 
option, it is natural to understand ‘suspension’ in this way. Paradigm cases of suspension 
are ones where we think that the proposition in question is about as likely as its negation. 
We suspend about whether a coin will land Heads when flipped. We suspend about 
whether each of two evenly matched teams will win the game. So this medium confidence 
sense of ‘suspension’ looks like a decent place to start when considering the rational 
status of higher-level suspension.5 But more importantly, other takes on ‘suspension’ 
would not work well in this context. Other takes, like that of openness to inquiry (Friedman 
2017: 307) or a kind of doxastic abstinence (Boghossian 2008: 447; Crawford 2004:226), 
would leave a key issue in a number of related debates about epistemic akrasia 
untouched. The issue is that of how confident or uncertain we may rationally be about 
the rationality of our attitudes. For while it may be rational to be open to inquiry about 
whether our attitudes are rational, or to have no view about whether they are rational, 
the question of how confident such inquiring or abstaining agents should be about their 
 
5  Some maintain that suspension is compatible with both high and low credences. For instance, opponents of the 
Lockean Thesis may say that when we buy a lottery ticket we should suspend about whether it will win (and about 
whether it will lose) despite having a low credence that it will win (and a high credence that it will lose). See, for 
example, Buchak (2014), Staffel (2015), and Jackson (2020). This possibility will not interrupt the arguments to come. 
The negative answer that I defend will allow for believing p along with a high credence that believing p is rational, 
even if that high credence does not translate to the higher-level belief that we believe rationally. Meanwhile, believing 
p despite a low credence that believing p is rational would appear clearly akratic, whether it comes with disbelief or 




attitudes’ rationality would remain.6 And it is the answer to this question that would shed 
light on matters of high epistemological significance, like the normative impact of higher-
order evidence such as peer disagreement, and relatedly, whether we have any a priori 
justification regarding what rational requirements obtain. These are matters that we could 
not tackle by reading ‘suspension’ in alternative ways.7 
 Second, the term ‘rational’ that features in the Higher-Level Suspension Question can 
be read propositionally or doxastically in each of its two appearances. This means that there 
are in principle four higher-level suspension questions to distinguish here. I will focus on 
the doxastic/propositional reading, i.e., where the first instance of ‘rational’ is read 
doxastically and the second propositionally, as other discussions of epistemic akrasia 
seem to.8 The resulting, and more precise higher-level suspension question that follows 
 
6  In fact, it is usually (perhaps always) rationally permitted to be open to inquiry and deliberation (though if morality 
encroaches on rational permission, that might render some inquiries irrational. See Basu (2019), Moss (2018), and 
Gardiner (2018)). For example, an agent who has an irrational belief is clearly permitted to be open to inquiry into 
whether she believes rationally. It is also not irrational to have no views about matters that we have not considered. 
Agents who have never considered whether they believe rationally are not irrational if they have no view on the matter.  
7  There are two more readings of ‘suspension’ worth mentioning. On the first, ‘suspension’ is the belief that the 
available evidence justifies neither belief nor disbelief in p (see Rosenkranz (2007) and Raleigh (2021)). This would 
make the Higher-Level Suspension Question concern the rationality of believing that our evidence justifies neither 
belief nor disbelief that our held attitude is rational. On the second, ‘suspension’ is a kind of imprecise credence (see 
Joyce (2010), Sturgeon (2010)). Although I did not form the arguments to come with that conception in mind, they do 
apply to some views of suspension as an imprecise credence. For instance, what I say will apply to a view that takes 
suspension to be a credence interval around a middling credence, like {.3—.7}, or a discontinuous interval like {.4, .5, 
.6}. 
8  See, for instance, Christensen (2013), Horowitz (2014), and Schoenfield (2015), where the discussions concern 
whether we may rationally disbelieve (doxastic justification) that our beliefs are supported by the evidence 
(propositional justification). There are additional reasons to focus on this reading of the questions over the alternatives. 
Discussing all would take us too far afield, but one alternative that is worth noting asks whether it is ever (doxastically) 
rational to believe that a particular doxastic attitude of ours is not (doxastically) rational. The answer to this question 
appears to be positive, for there is a kind of akratic state that has not been sufficiently addressed, and can be rationally 
permitted. We may call this state basing-only akrasia to distinguish it from the more familiar propositional akrasia—in 
which the agent believes p and believes that the evidence does not justify believing p. In basing-only akrasia, an agent 




from these two clarifications is this: 
 
(Higher-Level Suspension Question*) Can we ever rationally have both a 
doxastic attitude a toward a proposition p and a middling degree of 
confidence that our evidence rationally justifies a? 
 
As with the question of whether epistemic akrasia can be rational and with arguments 
that it cannot, the discussion to come will focus on potential conflicts within the agent 
who is in the state of higher-level suspension.9 Thus, the arguments will directly concern 
structural rationality, or coherence, as opposed to substantive rationality, or what the 
evidence supports.10 With that, I now explore the negative answer that I am after. 
 
(2) The negative answer so far 
Admittedly, the view that higher-level suspension is never rational faces some intuitive 
pushback. It can be hard to tell what rationality permits in different situations, and 
whether our attitude falls within the permitted range. This seems obviously true when 
the available evidence is complex, or when there is considerable disagreement over what 
rationality permits. In general, suspension of judgment is called for when we should not 
consider a proposition much more likely than its negation. It is therefore tempting to 
think that as long as it is hard to tell whether our attitude is permitted, we may suspend 
about whether it is. Such suspension can appear rational even when our attitude does fall 
 
the agent correctly assesses her evidence, rationally judges that her evidence sufficiently supports p, and lets her belief 
in p be guided and sustained by these judgments, her distrust in her basing does not seem to undermine the rationality 
of any of her beliefs. Smithies (2015: 2789) refers to an agent in this sort of case as believing a benign Moorean conjunction. 
9  For discussions of the internal conflicts of akratic agents see Greco (2014) and Horowitz (2014). 




within the rationally permitted range. But if this is right then the negative answer is 
wrong. Moreover, since what rationality permits is a complex and highly contested 
matter, it is frequently hard to tell whether our attitudes are rational. So we might expect 
higher-level suspension to not just be occasionally permitted, but to frequently be 
required. If this is right then the negative answer is dead wrong. 
 Nevertheless, there are reasons to think that higher-level suspension cannot be 
rational. In particular, I find two of the considerations in favor of this view especially 
instructive. The first comes from Michael Bergmann, who says that suspension about 
whether one’s attitude is rational defeats one’s justification for that attitude: 
 
If you are considering whether the actual basis of your belief that p is indicative of 
p’s truth and you find yourself resisting the belief that it is (because you have 
considered the matter and you have no idea whether it supports p or not), that 
seems to undercut your justification for believing p in the same way as if you 
believed outright that the actual basis for your belief that p did not indicate p’s 
truth. (Bergmann 2005: 426) 
 
The thought seems to be that having sufficient doubt about whether we believe rationally 
is ultimately as problematic as outright epistemic akrasia. If high confidence that we 
irrationally believe p undercuts our justification for p, then perhaps having no idea 
whether we believe p rationally could do so as well.  
 The second consideration comes from Michael Huemer (2011) and Declan Smithies 
(2012), who offer similar arguments against higher-level suspension. Huemer takes 
suspension about a proposition p to license assertions like it may or may not be the case that 
p. Smithies takes suspension about p to license assertions like it is an open question whether 




could assert that we may or may not be justified in believing p, and that it is an open question 
whether we are justified in believing p. Both kinds of assertions can appear to conflict with 
asserting p at the same time, as they would give rise to Moore-paradoxical-sounding 
utterances like p, but we may or may not be justified in believing p.  
 Allan Hazlett (2012) gives voice to the opposition. In response to Bergmann, Hazlett 
asks for more than an appeal-to-intuition that suspension at the higher level defeats our 
justification for the lower-level attitude in question. In response to Huemer, Hazlett 
challenges both the thought that it is improper to assert claims like p, but we may or may 
not be justified in believing p, and the thought that inability to properly assert a conjunction 
implies inability to rationally believe it. 
 I share the impression that the arguments for the irrationality of higher-level 
suspension do not go far enough. They do, however, establish a key point. They show 
that something quite confusing is going on with agents who suspend about whether a 
belief of theirs is rational. So even if the initial confusion regarding agents in this state 
does not imply their irrationality, we need some story by way of explaining how their 
chosen view fits with their suspension. Specifically, we need some story by way of 
explaining why their chosen view is somehow rationally preferable to others. Without 
such a story, I will argue, that chosen view would be arbitrary by these agents’ own lights. 
So, to advance the rational impermissibility of higher-level suspension, we need to show 
that there is something wrong with different ways of telling that story. 
 The plan for what follows is to demonstrate both the irrationality of agents who do 
not have such a story and the irrationality of agents who do. Here is the basic idea. An 
agent who suspends about whether her attitude is rational must be able to address the 
concern that she chose the attitude arbitrarily, and thus irrationally. Not addressing the 




the agent would be as irrational as an akratic agent—vindicating Bergmann’s suspicion. 
But the more promising alternative of addressing the concern would not end well either. 
For doing so would require the agent to defend the rational permissibility of her chosen 
attitude. In this case the agent would be incoherent, since her suspension about whether 
her chosen attitude is rational would conflict with her justifying the choice as rationally 
permissible.  
 
(3) Against higher-level suspension: a dilemma 
An agent who suspends about whether the evidence justifies her attitude toward p needs 
special reason to maintain that attitude over others. Without such reason, and given her 
suspension about the attitude’s rationality, the agent would be committed to thinking that 
she chose the attitude arbitrarily, and that she has it irrationally. So being sufficiently 
skeptical that an attitude of ours is justified carries with it a unique burden. In a slogan: 
with great doubts that an attitude is justified comes great responsibility to justify having it. 
 Imagine how a conversation with such an agent might go, depending on whether she 
had special reason for maintaining her chosen attitude over others. Upon learning that 
we face an agent who believes p but is quite skeptical that her evidence justifies the 
attitude, we may naturally ask what reasons she has to maintain her attitude toward p 
rather than some other attitude. The agent could respond in one of two basic ways: 
 
(Good Answer)  I have my chosen attitude for good reasons r1, r2… rn. 
 
(Bad Answer)  I lack good reason to maintain my chosen attitude. 
Different versions of Good Answer could help us understand why the agent has her 




Answer would do. Bad Answer would make the agent seem patently irrational: she 
would have an attitude, and maintain it despite conceding that she has it for no good 
reason. In other words, the agent would be committed to thinking that her chosen attitude 
is arbitrarily had. 
  Notice that a Bad Answer does not imply that the agent is explicitly akratic. The agent 
who suspends at the higher level and gives a Bad Answer does not believe that the 
evidence does not rationally justify her attitude. Instead, the agent considers her attitude 
to be arbitrarily had, regardless of what the evidence justifies. But if akrasia is an 
irrational state to be in, so is this. An agent who maintains an attitude despite thinking 
that she has it for no good reason seems just as irrational as one who maintains the 
attitude despite thinking there is no good reason for it. Both agents would reason with 
and act on the basis of their lower-level attitude, and at the same time deny that what 
they are doing is rational, or advise others not to follow suit. The same type of incoherence 
or fragmentation that is present in explicitly akratic agents is also present in agents who 
hold attitudes that they consider arbitrary. 
 The impression of irrationality that we get here is more robust than the one Huemer 
and Smithies invite us to have. In their discussions, we are asked to view as irrational an 
agent who asserts p and my evidence may or may not support p. But one thing that stands in 
the way of viewing such an agent as irrational is the possibility that the agent has some 
special reason for having her chosen attitude. Bad Answer eliminates that possibility, and 
paves the way for concluding that the agent indeed has an irrational combination of 
attitudes. So the state of higher-level suspension is irrational when paired with a Bad 
Answer of some kind. 
 It is worth noting that it is not necessary for the agent to be able to express her reasons 




could in principle appeal to by way of justifying her chosen attitude, despite her doubts 
that the evidence justifies that attitude. In the absence of such reasons, the agent would 
be committed to considering her belief arbitrary. So, to see if the agent could rationally 
maintain an attitude while suspending about its rationality, we should look into more 
promising responses along the lines of Good Answer. 
 What could the requisite Good Answer look like? Perhaps the most tempting answer 
is that the agent’s evidence itself may act as the reason that she has her chosen attitude 
rather than some other one. But that will not work. Recall that the agent suspends about 
whether the evidence justifies her attitude. The agent cannot appeal to the evidence as 
the reason why she has her chosen attitude, and at the same time be on the fence about 
whether the evidence justifies that attitude. That would be incoherent. 
 Consider, by analogy, an inept baker who cannot recall which of two steps of a 
cupcake recipe comes first: the baking of the mixture, or the application of the frosting. 
As a result, the baker suspends about which comes first. Suppose that the baker 
nevertheless proceeds to bake the mixture first. The baker could not justify the action by 
appeal to the recipe itself, for they are clueless as to which step comes first. So even 
though the recipe in fact requires baking the mixture first, that fact is not available to the 
baker as a reason for the action, since they are on the fence about which step comes first. 
Similarly, an agent who suspends about whether the evidence rationally justifies her 
attitude needs to be able to appeal to something other than the evidence itself in order to 
maintain her attitudes rationally. 
 Perhaps a better Good Answer could appeal to the attitude that the agent takes her 
situation to probably justify. There is nothing obviously incoherent with being uncertain 
about which of a few possible attitudes is rationally permitted, and at the same time 




may think that there is a 24% chance that credence c1 is permitted, a 25% chance that 
credence c2 is, and a 51% chance that credence c3 is.11 In such a case, the agent could say 
that she has c3 because it is most likely the permitted credence, even though she suspends 
on whether c3 is permitted. Call this the Probability Answer.  
 The Probability Answer does a good job of accounting for the agent’s having the 
attitude that she has and not another. It identifies a feature of the attitude, namely, the 
agent’s belief that it is more likely than others to be rational, and offers that as the reason 
to have the attitude. The answer also appears to fit nicely with the agent’s middling 
credence that her attitude is rational. However, the answer ultimately does not fit with 
suspension about whether the attitude is rational. The problem is that an agent who offers 
such an answer is implicitly committed to a principle that tells us what we may believe 
in situations like hers. The Probability Answer would commit the agent to something like 
the following principle:  
 
(The Probably Rational Principle) When attitude a is probably the rationally 
permitted one, then it is rationally permitted to have it.  
 
 The implicit commitment comes from the agent’s appeal to the claim that her attitude 
is probably rational as the reason why she chose it. For suppose that the agent offered the 
Probability Answer and also rejected The Probably Rational Principle. In that case, we 
would wonder why the agent thinks that the fact that her chosen attitude is probably 
rational justifies having it. Thus, to properly address our question of what reason the 
 
11  This line works best when the agent considers one of the possible attitudes more than 50% likely to be the rational 
one. If, for example, the agent takes each of a set of credences c1 through c8 to be 11% likely to be rational, and c9 to be 
12% likely to be rational, it would seem that the agent would not be suspending about whether c9 is rational. We would 




agent has for maintaining her chosen attitude, a Good Answer like the Probability 
Answer requires (at least implicit) belief in a corresponding principle like The Probably 
Rational Principle.  
 Now comes trouble. An agent who subscribes to The Probably Rational Principle 
thinks that when an attitude is most likely rationally permitted, then it is rationally 
permitted. Such an agent cannot take her attitude to be most likely permitted, and at the 
same time suspend about whether the attitude is permitted, on pain of incoherence. 
Thinking that our attitude is probably rational, and thinking that it is rational to have the 
attitude that is probably rational, together rule out seriously doubting that our attitude is 
rational.12 
 The Probability Answer is one example of a Good Answer. Yet the conclusion we 
should draw is more general. The same argumentative moves are available against any 
other Good Answer that the agent may offer by way of explaining why she has the 
attitude that she has. Any such answer would effectively be offering some reason for why 
it is rational to have the attitude that the agent does, despite her suspension about 
whether the attitude is rational. This would commit the agent to a corresponding 
principle that says that when certain criteria are met, a certain attitude is rationally permitted. 
But subscribing to such a principle, while thinking that the relevant criteria are met, 
implies that the attitude is indeed permitted. So the agent could not suspend about 
whether her attitude is permitted if she has some kind of Good Answer to why she has 
 
12  We get a similar result on a credence framework. If the agent has a high credence in the claim that her chosen 
attitude is probably rational, and also a high credence that The Probably Rational Principle is correct, the agent cannot 
coherently have a middling credence that her chosen attitude is rational. However, if the agent has a not-so-high 
credence in each (say, .7 that her attitude is probably rational and .7 in The Probably Rational Principle), then the agent 
could not use their conjunction by way of a Good Answer. For the agent would only have a middling credence that the 





 Applying the argument to a few other possible Good Answers can help demonstrate 
its generality.  For starters, consider a recent suggestion by David Christensen concerning 
when epistemic akrasia is rational:  
 
Epistemic akrasia is not, per se, a problem at all. Thinking that a belief of yours is irrational 
in a particular way should disturb you—that is, give you a reason to change that belief—
only insofar as the particular irrationality indicates that a different belief would have 
greater expected accuracy. (Christensen 2016: 416) 
 
If we apply this suggestion to the case of higher-level suspension, we get an agent who 
suspends about whether her credence c is rational, and offers Christensen’s explanation 
as to why she nevertheless has c. In so doing, the agent would be committing herself to a 
principle like the following:  
 
(Greatest Expected Accuracy Principle) Unless a different credence than one’s 
own has greater expected accuracy, it is rational to maintain one’s own 
credence.  
  
 Recall that the question of interest here is whether an agent who suspends about 
whether her attitude is rational can coherently appeal to the relevant principle by way of 
justifying her credence given her higher-level suspension. The question is not whether 
the principle that the agent appeals to is in fact true.13 The answer to the former question 
 
13  There is a caveat here. The negative answer to the Higher-Level Suspension Question that I defend has it that if 
epistemic akrasia is irrational then so is higher-level suspension. However, some potential Good Answers may 




appears to be negative. If the agent believed the principle to be true, she could no longer 
suspend about whether her credence is rational. She would be committed to believing 
that it is rational, since she believes that her credence satisfies the accuracy criterion, and 
since she takes the principle to be correct.  
 Another test case for the argument’s generality comes from Richard Feldman’s (2006; 
2007) discussion of disagreement. As Hazlett (2012: 205) notes, Feldman’s argument for 
the need to suspend judgment when disagreeing with a peer seems to rest on a principle 
about higher-level suspension. According to that principle, when we should suspend 
about which attitude regarding p is rational, we should also suspend about p. Now 
suppose that an agent who suspends about whether her lower-level attitude is rational 
appeals to such a principle in order to justify her lower-level attitude. At that point the 
agent could look at her lower-level attitude of suspension about p, see that it is in line 
with Feldman’s view, and come to believe that the attitude is rational. But this would not 
fit with the agent’s suspension about which attitude toward p is rational. Subscribing to 
such a principle would not allow the agent to continue suspending about what attitude 
she should have toward p.  
 For a last test case, consider an agent who justifies her chosen attitude by appeal to a 
kind of permitted arbitrariness. On such a view, if we rationally think that two attitudes 
toward p are equally likely to be rationally permitted, then it is rationally permitted to 
choose one arbitrarily. This would not avoid the problem either. An agent who appeals to 
this view would be committed to the claim that her arbitrarily chosen attitude is in fact 
rationally permitted, which would conflict with her suspension about whether her 
 
may be one such case. And although it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess whether those principles are true and 
whether their truth can establish the rationality of akrasia, it is useful to see why appeal to such principles could not 




attitude is permitted. 
 The lesson is that the details of any Good Answer do not matter much. An agent 
cannot both engage in justifying her attitude over others, and also suspend about whether 
the attitude is justified. And since not engaging in this kind of justification (or providing 
a Bad Answer) leaves the agent’s chosen attitude looking arbitrary by her own lights, 
higher-level suspension is in a bind. It therefore seems irrational to have an attitude 
toward a proposition p while suspending about whether that attitude is rational. 
 
(4) Justificatory burdens and higher-level certainty 
Two concerns about the argument are worth pausing for. One challenges the claim that 
an agent in the state of higher-level suspension needs to justify having her lower-level 
attitude over others in the first place. Another states that the argument implies the 
irrationality of any degree of uncertainty about whether we believe rationally.  
 
(4.1) The need for justification 
The first concern starts with the observation that we often believe things rationally 
despite having no story as to why we believe as we do. Perceptual beliefs provide one 
kind of example. We can justifiably believe that the person over there looks familiar without 
being able to justify why we think that they look familiar. As the famous chicken-sexer 
example shows (Armstrong: 431), an agent can justifiably believe that this chicken is male 
without being able to specify why she does not believe that it is female instead. Beliefs 
held by children provide another example, for they may be unable to provide reasons for 
their beliefs despite having those beliefs rationally. If this is right, then the mere fact that 
an agent cannot provide justification for having her chosen view over others need not 




goes, an agent who has no answer for why she maintains her attitude is not automatically 
committed to anything that is in tension with her suspension about whether her attitude 
is rational. 
 Let us grant for the sake of discussion that agents typically do not need to be able to 
justify having their beliefs over others in order to have those beliefs rationally. 
Demanding such justification may be asking too much of believers, who on many 
epistemically unproblematic occasions could not offer it. But the thoughts that we should 
not ask too much of believers, and that we could consider their beliefs rational even if 
they cannot justify having them, are much less compelling when we learn that the agents 
themselves have serious doubts that they believe rationally. A chicken-sexer who doubts 
that her belief about the bird’s sex fits her overall perceptual experience should perhaps 
double check rather than carry on believing that the bird is male.14 The fact that an agent 
has a skeptical attitude toward her own rationality seems to open the door for us to 
demand (and for the agent to need) something extra. 
 But regardless of whether the agent can retain her lower-level attitude rationally 
without answering this demand, the argument against higher-level suspension would 
still go through. The argument’s conclusion is not that the higher-level suspender who 
cannot provide a good reason to favor her chosen attitude has that attitude irrationally. 
Rather, the conclusion is that the agent’s combination of attitudes is irrational—much like 
in the case of epistemic akrasia. The argument points to a conflict that arises from the 
agent’s holding an attitude and suspending about whether that attitude is rational. In the 
absence of some kind of Good Answer, the suspension at the higher level commits the 
agent to thinking that her lower-level attitude is no better than a guess (even when it is 
 




in fact much better). The result is that the agent could not rationally maintain her 
combination of attitudes, irrespective of whether her lower-level attitude is rationally 
had. So, the response to the concern here is that while agents who higher-level suspend 
might retain their lower-level attitude rationally despite having no story as to why they 
have it specifically, their entire doxastic state would be irrational.15 
 Relatedly, some may think that the choice between Good Answer and Bad Answer 
rests on a false dichotomy. An in-between option is for the agent to either suspend 
judgment or have no view about whether she has good reason to favor her lower-level 
attitude. That way the agent might appear to avoid both horns of the dilemma. The agent 
would not be providing some Good Answer that would commit her to viewing her 
chosen attitude as ultimately rational. The agent would also not be providing some Bad 
Answer that would commit her to viewing her chosen attitude as arbitrary and no better 
than a guess.  
 However, it does not make a difference whether the agent provides a Bad Answer, 
avoids providing an answer, or suspends judgment about whether her attitude is 
arbitrary. By having serious doubts that her lower-level attitude is rational, and in the 
absence of some Good Answer for having it over others, the agent’s attitude already looks 
like a guess. It is at that point that epistemic damage is done, and a burden is placed on 
 
15  Notice that we could not say the same of the chicken-sexer who finds herself without a story as to why she believes 
as she does. If we could, then once we confronted the chicken-sexer about her inability to justify her belief, the argument 
would yield the unintuitive result that the chicken-sexer’s state on the whole is irrational. Yet there is distance between 
noticing that we cannot offer reasons for a belief, and thinking that there is a good chance that the belief is irrational. 
A chicken-sexer might appeal to her perceptual experience, and say that something about it justifies her judgment that 
the bird is male—though she is not sure what. This position could be perfectly rational, and prevent the agent from 
landing in a state of higher-level suspension. In fact, we do this kind of thing all the time. For example, we might tell 
our partner of an especially odd colleague whom they have to meet. The fact that we have a hard time explaining what 
about a person’s behavior makes us think that they are odd typically does not make us think that our belief that they 




the agent to show otherwise. No further suspension of judgment or abstaining from 
having a view about whether there is a good reason to prefer that attitude would undo 
this damage. So, whether the agent explicitly offers a Bad Answer or offers no answer at 
all, her attitude would remain arbitrary by her own lights.  
 Importantly, what I say here should apply equally well regardless of what the agent’s 
lower-level attitude is. For instance, when one thinks that there is about a 50% chance 
that, say, a .82 credence in p is irrational, it would seem arbitrary to stick to .82. There is 
clearly nothing unique to .82 that makes it not look arbitrary when we are highly 
suspicious of its rationality. But notice that the same can be said of any other lower-level 
attitude or credence, including suspension of judgment or .5. Granted, suspension of 
judgment and .5 do have a certain unique feature, namely being exactly in between full 
belief and full disbelief. But this feature does not make having such an attitude any less 
arbitrary when we think there is about a 50% chance that it is irrational. For suppose that 
the agent who suspends about whether her lower-level suspension (or .5) is rational is 
equally confident that full belief (or some particular high credence) is rational. Such an 
agent would blatantly be picking one of only two viable options for no reason 
whatsoever. This shows that the unique features of suspension of judgment do not shield 
it from looking arbitrary when combined with higher-level suspension. And while it may 
be that in some cases sticking to suspension at the lower level is not arbitrary for some 
reason, the agent would have to appeal to such a reason in order to avoid any charge of 
arbitrariness. In other words, the agent would have to use that reason as part of a Good 
Answer to why they maintain their lower-level suspension—at which point the problems 
of providing such an answer would come in.16  
 




 Lastly, even if the arguments in this paper were to only apply to agents whose lower-
level attitude is not suspension, the implications would still go quite far. We would still 
be left with the result that whenever we should have a somewhat decisive view about 
p—be it belief, disbelief, or some credence other than .5—then on the assumption that 
epistemic akrasia is irrational higher-level suspension would be irrational too. So we 
would still end up with an extensive prohibition on suspension about whether we believe 
rationally.  
 
(4.2) Normative certainty 
A second concern is that if the argument that I advance works, then it could also establish 
the irrationality of the slightest doubt that a belief of ours is rational. The thought is that 
if serious doubts about our rationality result in an incoherent state, then so might slight 
doubts. Since we frequently make mistakes in reasoning, having some doubt that we 
believe rationally on a specific occasion seems perfectly rational. So it would be a dubious 
upshot of the argument on offer if it deemed irrational all agents who have some small 
degree of uncertainty that a belief of their is rational.  
 To motivate the worry, here is how we may think that a version of the argument could 
apply to an agent who has only a slight doubt that she believes rationally. Suppose we 
face an agent who believes, but is uncertain, that her doxastic attitude toward p is 
 
rational, and the agent who suspends about which attitude is rational. It would take some argument, but perhaps there 
is a way to show that an agent who suspends about the latter may opt for .5 at the lower level in a non-arbitrary way. 
However, such an agent is not the agent who is in the state of higher-level suspension. An agent in the state of higher-
level suspension who has .5 as her lower-level attitude thinks that .5 is about as likely to be rational as it is to be 
irrational. But an agent who suspends about which attitude is rational does not seem committed to such a view about 
.5. For example, an agent can suspend about which of all the possible credences is rational, and thus have very low 





rational. As before, we may wonder why the agent has the attitude despite her 
uncertainty, and think that the agent must justify having her lower-level attitude given 
her slight higher-level doubt. In response, the agent might say that it is permissible to 
have an attitude despite a little uncertainty. At that point the agent would seem 
committed to the claim that her attitude is rational, and should no longer be uncertain 
about whether it is. Alternatively, if the agent cannot justify having her chosen attitude 
over others, we may say that her attitude is arbitrary and irrational by her own lights.  
 Does the argument commit us to the view that rationality requires certainty about 
whether we believe rationally? One thing to note is that this worry is not unique to the 
view that higher-level suspension is irrational. The worry applies more generally to views 
that consider epistemic akrasia irrational. The thought is that if strong distrust that we 
believe rationally (of the sort p, but believing p is irrational) is irrational, then a little distrust 
amounts to at least a little irrationality. In credence terms, if having a very high credence 
that our attitude a is irrational makes maintaining a blatantly irrational, then having a 
low (but non-zero) credence that a is irrational makes maintaining a somewhat 
irrational.17 
 But more to the point, an agent’s higher-level belief that her lower-level attitude is 
rational can fit just fine with some uncertainty about whether that attitude is rational. This 
is a key difference between the agent who is only slightly uncertain that her attitude is 
rational and the agent who is quite skeptical and suspends judgment about whether it is. 
The agent who suspends judgment about whether her attitude is rational cannot at the 
same time have a confident view about what attitudes we should have in cases of such 
 
17  Lasonen-Aarnio (2020) notes this worry. Dorst (2020) offers a possible solution. See Skipper (forthcoming) for a 




higher-level doubt. But the agent who is only slightly uncertain that her attitude is 
rational can consistently maintain the attitude, and at the same time commit herself to a 
principle that says that her attitude is rational. As long as the agent is not certain of that 
principle, her commitment to the claim that the attitude is rational does not entail 
certainty that it is.  
 For example, suppose that S believes that global warming is largely manmade, and 
also believes that her belief on the matter is rational. Nevertheless, S has some doubts that 
her belief is indeed rational—say she has a .9 credence that it is, and a .1 credence that it 
is not. Suppose we then ask S why she believes that global warming is largely manmade, 
given that she also has some doubt that this is the rational belief to have. S has a perfectly 
good way to answer our question. S could say that she believes global warming is largely 
manmade because this is what her evidence probably justifies, and she also strongly 




It can be rational to believe p despite having no view about whether we believe p 
rationally. It can also be rational to believe p despite our continued inquiry and 
deliberation about whether p. Problems begin when we believe p and have serious 
doubts that we believe p rationally. Having such doubts requires us to do something to 
restore rational harmony. But once we do that something—for instance, by appeal to 
principles that imply we may believe p despite our doubts—we undermine those doubts. 
 What does this show? The thought that epistemic akrasia is irrational has more 




epistemic akrasia is irrational then false beliefs about what rationality permits are 
themselves irrational. This is Titelbaum’s (2015:253) Fixed Point Thesis, which says that 
“mistakes about the requirements of rationality are mistakes of rationality.” Titelbaum 
(2015: 276) tried to push the implications further, by arguing that the best explanation of 
the irrationality of akrasia is that we have indefeasible a priori justification for true beliefs 
about what rationality requires. The arguments in this paper can strengthen the case for 
a link between the irrationality of akrasia and our having such a priori justification. If the 
irrationality of akrasia implies the irrationality of higher-level suspension, the only option 
remaining for an agent who should believe p is to also believe that she should believe p. 
We would thus get a surprisingly strong level-connection principle, according to which 
rational justification for any lower-level attitude can never be had without justification 
that that attitude is rationally justified. So it would not merely be, as the Fixed Point 
Thesis suggests, that we always lack support for false beliefs about what rationality 
requires. For that could happen if we simply have little evidence about what is rational, 
and if suspension on the matter is permitted. But if strong level-connection obtains, it 
must be that we always have enough support for true beliefs about what rationality 
requires in different situations. That result may be hard to account for without supposing 
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